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NOTES
A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP: HOW
THE LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY





This Note will examine how the adoption of the Low-Profit
Limited Liability Company (L3C) can facilitate the growth of the
United States’ wind energy infrastructure.  The L3C is a hybrid
legal form that has been statutorily defined in eight states.  As
adopted, the L3C is an amalgamation of for-profit and not-for-
profit purposes.  The form allows for both socially beneficial
ends and positive investor returns.  In theory, the L3C will help
capture a growing body of socially minded investors with an
interest in “doing good” and generating a profit.
This Note will begin with a discussion of the L3C.  This will
include looking at the ethical impetus for the L3C and its place
in the greater context of corporate and not-for-profit law.  The
examination of the L3C will continue with a discussion of how
the form serves as a vehicle for socially beneficial investment.
This will involve a discussion of typical L3C governing statutes,
how the L3C is designed to leverage private foundation funds,
and how the form may help encourage private investment.  I will
also address arguments against the adoption of the L3C and why
the entity has been described as superfluous.  The Note will then
turn to the application of the L3C to the development of the
U.S.’s wind energy industry.  This will include showing how the
L3C may prove to be an important tool for leveraging private
foundation investment, taking advantage of state and federal
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2013.  I would like to thank
Professor Lloyd Mayer for inspiring and guiding my work on this Note and Paul
N. Belval for his insight into energy markets.  I would also like to thank the
JLEPP editorial board and staff for their hard work in preparing this Note.
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incentives, and creating a “brand” synonymous with socially ben-
eficial ends.
I. THE L3C AND THE GROWTH OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The L3C is a legal form designed to take advantage of inves-
tor interest in social enterprise.1  The L3C was designed by Rob-
ert Lang of the Mary Elizabeth & Gordon Mannweiler
Foundation to combine the goals of social engagement and
profit-making.2  The form was developed to help harness a full
spectrum of investors—from not-for-profit private foundations to
institutional actors—and to overcome some of the traditional
limitations of the for-profit and not-for-profit forms.3  The L3C
accomplishes this through statutory requirements and a flexible
organizational structure that allows for the distribution of risks
and returns.  The branding of the L3C is also part of a concerted
effort to capture awareness and public trust.4  Arguments against
the adoption of the L3C form arise from the lack of federal rec-
ognition, potential redundancy based on already available forms,
and practical and theoretical issues of board and investor confu-
sion resulting from the “serving two masters” problem.5
A. The Emergence of a Fourth Sector
The L3C has developed in response to the limitations of typ-
ical for-profit and not-for-profit forms.  While for-profit entities
are able to engage in socially beneficial projects,6 these for-profit
businesses have traditionally been limited in the extent that they
can stray from the purpose of making a profit.  As described in
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., and in myriad decisions shaping director
and officer fiduciary duties since, the purpose of a corporation is
1. A social enterprise has been defined as “ ‘an organization or venture
that achieves its primary social or environmental mission using business meth-
ods,’ typically by operating a revenue-generating business.”  Robert A. Katz &
Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 59 (2010) (quoting
Social Enterprise: Defining the Movement, SOC. ENTER. ALLIANCE, http://www.se-alli-
ance.org/about_movement.cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2013)).
2. James P. Joseph & Andras Kosaras, New Strategies for Leveraging Founda-
tion Assets, 20 TAX’N  EXEMPTS 22, 29 (2008).
3. Id.
4. Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Con-
struct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related
Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010); Daniel S.
Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit
Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879 (2010).
6. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 589–90 (N.J. 1953).
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to make a profit, that is, to benefit shareholders.7  This formula-
tion, though applied more flexibly now than in the early twenti-
eth century, explains the risk a for-profit entity takes by placing a
socially beneficial activity above the pursuit of profits.8  Though
directors are protected by the business judgment rule, it ulti-
mately is not in a director’s or a corporation’s best interest to
push the boundaries of what constitutes business as usual.
Different theories have been proffered to address the dis-
connect between the role of for-profit entities in society and the
corporation’s profit-driven focus.9  The “Contractarian” view
describes a corporation as a “web of contracts.”10  The different
vested interests in the corporation (shareholders, directors, cli-
ents, etc.) are born from what these differing actors have
invested in the corporation.  The web of contracts that results
benefits society.  That is, the purpose of the corporation is to
make profits for the shareholder because shareholder wealth is
societal wealth.  Society inputs security and infrastructure and
gets the return of taxes and the benefits of what is produced.
The implication in this discussion is that corporations—and by
extension for-profit entities as a whole—benefit society through
the creation of wealth.  The merits of this conclusion should not
be overstated.  While wealth plays a significant role, there are
many different ways to benefit society beyond the use and distri-
bution of capital.
For the purpose of this paper, the “Communitarian” model
better encapsulates the multifaceted nature of societal growth
and public benefit.  The theory posits a quid pro quo relation-
7. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.  The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that
end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes.”).
8. Even with the broad statement of purpose typically used in corporate
charters and bylaws (“to engage in any lawful activity”), a lawful activity within
this paradigm is one in which shareholder value is maximized.
9. Some jurisdictions provide for “other constituency statutes,” which per-
mit a director to look at a variety of constituencies in the process of making a
business judgment.  However, the Delaware case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co. indicates that while a board may consider the needs of other constitu-
encies, ultimately those other considerations must be balanced against the
needs of the shareholders.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955–56 (Del. 1985).
10. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Gen-
eration Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779 (2006).
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ship between corporations and society.11  Society permits corpo-
rations to exist and, in return, there is an expectation that
corporations conform to norms of social responsibility.  Corpora-
tions are a “web of relationships” connected to all stakeholders.
This “web of relationships” leads to the idea that, while the pur-
suit of profits is paramount, corporations must also have a social
consciousness, e.g., treating employees well, minimizing pollu-
tion, and giving to charity.12  While these models provide an
interesting structure to frame our expectations for corporate
behavior, the real-world practice of for-profit entities has (in
part) catalyzed the development of the L3C.
The not-for-profit world13 is comprised of a variety of organi-
zations that have been granted a special status because of their
role in civil society.14  That said, the not-for-profit form can also
limit an organization’s ability to develop and finance projects
and products.15  Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
requires that all entities seeking tax exemption under that provi-
sion be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, scientific, or other enumerated purposes.16  A 501(c)(3)
organization17 is also prohibited from causing earnings to inure
to the benefit of any private individual.18  These two require-
ments influence the scope of not-for-profit work.19  With their
11. David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 523, 526 (2011) (“[N]onshareholders should not be required to rely
on their own contractual bargaining capabilities to protect their interests.”).
12. See Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L.
REV. 391, 491 (1997) (explaining that communitarianism asks that legal
enforcement move to “enforcement of a norm of fidelity to the interests of the
dependent, and from there . . . fidelity to the unity of state conceived interests
and objectives that is the norm of solidarity.”).
13. This world is often referred to as the “Third Sector,” distinct from the
government and for-profit sectors.
14. For the purpose of this Note, I will focus on those not-for-profits col-
loquially known as 501(c)(3)s because they qualify for exemption from federal
income tax under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) (2010).
15. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2008).
16. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
17. Entities organized under section 501(c)(3) are more commonly
known as “charities.”  The Internal Revenue Code provides 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions with a number of benefits, including tax exemption and the ability to
receive tax-deductible contributions.  26 U.S.C. § 170 (2010).  This special sta-
tus helps channel private (and public) funds towards socially desirable goals.
18. This prohibition applies regardless of whether the beneficiaries are
insiders (known as private inurement) or outsiders (private benefit). See 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
19. The limitations on the way that a 501(c)(3) may be organized and
operated—the purpose and the performance of that purpose—limit the type of
businesses that may be brought under the 501(c)(3) umbrella.  Not every
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relatively narrow purpose and a dependency on outside funding,
not-for-profits have been unable to take full advantage of a grow-
ing culture of socially engaged investors.
Social enterprise organizations represent a separate “fourth
sector,” comprised of the values and goals that drive the for-
profit and not-for-profit worlds.20  These organizations “combine
charitable missions, corporate methods, and social and environ-
mental consciousness in ways that transcend traditional business
and philanthropy.”21  They are therefore meant to fill the gap
between the corporate and not-for-profit models.22  Social enter-
prise organizations include such entities as the L3C, the Benefit
Corporation,23 the Flexible Purpose Corporation,24 and interna-
tionally, the Community Interest Company.25  Like the for-profit
organization can be this type of not-for-profit.  The second requirement—the
no inurement requirement—is far more significant to the discussion of the
L3C.  501(c)(3)s rely on charitable donations (and the corresponding benefits
to the donor as an incentive) and federal and state governments to support
their missions.  This reliance is born from the inability of the nonprofit to pro-
vide returns to investors or directors.  While 501(c)(3)s are free to make a
profit, that profit must in turn be reinvested in the organization. JAMES J. FISH-
MAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
445–52 (4th ed. 2010).  Private inurement can be met with intermediary sanc-
tions, significant tax assessments, and revocation of 501(c)(3) status.  This real-
ity significantly inhibits the ability of a 501(c)(3) to attract investors in support
of its mission.  Private benefit, or the distribution of benefits, to non-insiders is
also closely regulated, though with less harsh penalties. Id. at 458–60.
20. THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, ASPEN INST., MIXING MISSION AND BUSINESS:
DOES SOCIAL ENTERPRISE NEED A NEW LEGAL APPROACH? 2 (Jan. 2007).
21. Id.
22. Public institutions make up the final sector (the “second” sector).
23. Benefit Corporations share a number of similarities with the L3C.
Benefit Corporations have dual missions, but their governance systems are
more akin to a traditional corporation when compared to the L3C.  Dana
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 611–17 (2011).  The Benefit Corporation is a crea-
ture of statute.  This differs from a B-Company, which is a for-profit entity that
has received a certification from a private company, indicating that the corpora-
tion has demonstrated “their commitment to a dual mission of making profits
and promoting social good.” Id. at 592.
24. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2500 (West 2012).  The Flexible Purpose Corpora-
tion is a legal form that “allow[s] a corporation to integrate the for-profit phi-
losophy of the traditional corporation with a special purpose mission that is
similar to a charitable purpose.”  Angelica Salceda, Flexible Purpose Corporation:
California’s New Corporate Form, BERKELEY L. BLOGS (Dec. 13, 2011, 6:28 PM),
http://thenetwork.berkeleylawblogs.org/2011/12/13/flexible-purpose-corpo-
ration-california%E2%80%99s-new-corporate-form/.
25. The Community Interest Company (CIC) is a British corporate model
that has been “created for the use of people who want to conduct a business or
other activity for community benefit, and not purely for private advantage.”
Community Interest Companies, DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, http://www.
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firm, these firms operate with the intent to make a profit.  But,
this profit will come “in a manner that generates more public
benefit or positive externalities than would a conventional for-
profit firm.”26  They are said to operate with a “double bottom
line,” working to benefit both owners and society.27  Some have
argued that these so called social enterprise organizations should
be afforded the same tax exemption rights as not-for-profits.28
While that proposal fights for traction, the L3C fills the gap cre-
ated by the legal limitations of the for-profit and not-for-profit
dichotomy.  As a hybrid entity, the L3C aims to fuse social well-
being, ideals of corporate behavior, and the realities of investor
behavior.
B. Defining the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company
The L3C is designed to bridge the gap between the for-
profit and not-for-profit forms and thereby generate investment
in social enterprise.  The statutory definition of an L3C is typi-
cally appended to a state’s limited liability company statute.29
L3C statutes have been enacted in eight states.30  The enacted
statutes generally have consistent language.31  The first state to
pass L3C legislation was Vermont in 2008, quickly followed by
bis.gov.uk/cicregulator (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).  For more information on the
CIC see id.
26. Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 86.
27. This formulation shares similarities to the Communitarian theory dis-
cussed previously. See supra Part I.A.  Andrew Savitz and Karl Weber have also
argued for a “triple bottom line,” looking at people, profit, and planet.  Katz &
Page, supra note 1, at 86 n.164.
28. BILLITTERI, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing Anup Malani and Eric A.
Posner’s argument in their paper “The Case for For-Profit Charities”, available
at Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV.
2017 (2007)).
29. John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Frame-
work for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010).
30. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302
(2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 1611 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m)
(2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01(d) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-76 (2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-3-1302 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (2008);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-102(a)(ix) (2010).
31. For instance the Vermont statute reads:
“L3C,” or “low-profit limited liability company” means a person organized
under this chapter that is organized for a business purpose that satisfies and is
at all times operated to satisfy each of the following requirements:
A. The company:
i. significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charita-
ble or educational purposes within the meaning of section
170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(B); and
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Michigan and Wyoming.32 L3C statutes track the statutory defini-
tion of a “program related investment” (PRI).  The PRI is a tool
used by private foundations to make potentially jeopardizing
investments.33  This is an explicit effort to leverage private foun-
dation capital.  The belief is that initial private foundation invest-
ments and risk acceptance will incentivize both additional private
and public investments.  The name “L3C” is also an attempt to
create a brand.34  In much the same way that the not-for-profit
form makes use of a brand that signals a unique societal role,
affixing “L3C” to the end of a company name is meant to evoke
the notion of a socially responsible business.35  According to
interSector Partners, L3C, a company dedicated to promoting
the adoption of the L3C, 658 L3Cs have been formed
nationwide.36
A PRI is an investment made by a private foundation
through an exception to the jeopardizing investment rule.37  A
jeopardizing investment is an investment of any amount that
might “jeopardize the carrying out of any of [the foundation’s]
exempt purposes . . . .”38  The IRS has further defined a jeopard-
izing investment as one in which managers “have failed to exer-
cise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and
circumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in
providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the
foundation to carry out its exempt purposes.”39  Such an invest-
ment will result in a tax equal to 10% of the investment on the
foundation and on any managers who willfully participated in
ii. would not have been formed but for the company’s relationship
to the accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes.
B. No significant purpose of the company is the production of income
or the appreciation of property; provided, however, that the fact that a
person produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not,
in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of
property.”
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001.
32. David J. Schwister, Note, L3Cs: The Next Big Wave in Socially Responsible
Investing or Just Simply Too Good to Be True?, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1,
4–5 (2009).
33. Id. at 3.
34. Lang & Minnigh, supra note 4, at 17.
35. Id.
36. Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, http://www.intersector
l3c.com/l3c_tally.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
37. 26 U.S.C. § 4944(a) (2010).
38. Id.
39. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1 (2012).
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making the investment.40  If the investment is not corrected
within the next taxable period an additional 25% tax is imposed
on the foundation and a 5% tax on foundation managers who
refuse to remove the investment from jeopardy.41  These are sig-
nificant penalties.  The PRI exception to the jeopardizing invest-
ment tax is available for those investments “the primary purpose
of which is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described
in section 170(c)(2)(B), and no significant purpose of which is
the production of income or the appreciation of property . . . .”42
While the PRI seems like an accessible way to work around
the jeopardizing investment tax, its use has been limited.  The
effort and expense needed to ensure the investment is appropri-
ate coupled with the stiffness of the penalty has acted as a deter-
rent.43  An investment will qualify as a PRI only if three
conditions are met:
1. The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish
one or more charitable purposes.
2. Neither the production of income nor the appreciation
of property is a significant purpose of the investment.
3. The purposes of the investment do not include engag-
ing in lobbying or advocacy [or other election
activities].44
A “but-for” test is used to determine whether the invest-
ment’s primary purpose is charitable.  This means that the invest-
ment must primarily further the foundation’s charitable purpose
and “would not have been made but for such relationship
between the investment and the accomplishment of the founda-
tion’s exempt activities.”45 In private letter rulings, the IRS has
looked to whether there is a “nexus between the PRI and the
foundation’s exempt mission and inquires into the relative
‘necessity’ of the PRI.”46  The concern in this part of the test is
whether an investment actually qualifies for the PRI.  The ambi-
guity in the IRS’s definition requires a cautious approach by
foundation managers.47  Going forward with a PRI necessitates a
40. Id. The tax on managers is capped at $10,000 upon the finding of a
jeopardizing investment under § 4944(a).  26 U.S.C. § 4944(d)(2) (2010).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 4944(b) (2010). The tax associated with this penalty is
capped at $20,000 per investment.  26 U.S.C. § 4944(d)(2).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2010).
43. Benjamin N. Feit, What IRS Private Letter Rulings Reveal About Program-
Related Investments, 23 TAX’N EXEMPTS 3 (2011).
44. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) (2012).
45. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (2012).
46. Feit, supra note 43, at 9.
47. Id.
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strong opinion from qualified counsel or a private letter ruling
by the IRS.  Both of these options result in significant expendi-
tures of time and money.48  A foundation will likely also have to
act with “expenditure responsibility” over a PRI as well.  Expendi-
ture responsibility requires a foundation to closely oversee the
actions of the investment recipient to ensure that the recipient is
not exposing the foundation to jeopardizing investment taxes or
calling into question the foundation’s exempt status.49  This por-
tion of the test has proven to be a significant roadblock to the
widespread use of the PRI.
The “substantial purpose” test looks to whether the produc-
tion of income or property is a significant purpose of the invest-
ment.  The relevant factor in this test is whether “investors solely
engaged in the investment for profit would be likely to make the
investment on the same terms as the private foundation.”50  How-
ever, an investment will not be disqualified just because it results
in income.51  The “Low-Profit” part of the L3C’s name has been
described as a misnomer in this regard.52  While PRIs, and L3Cs
by extension, cannot be organized with the substantial purpose
of producing a profit, this does not preclude the making of a
profit.53  The L3C and the private foundation can return a profit
at, or above, market levels.54  The final requirements which pro-
hibit expenditures for political campaigns or lobbying track the
regular limitations imposed on private foundations and are of
less interest to this inquiry.
The L3C’s enacting statute closely mirrors the language of
the PRI investment requirements.  This is designed to facilitate
the use of PRIs.55  The form is meant to provide certainty in a
realm where foundations have felt anything but certain.  The
goal, therefore, is two-fold: first, to provide assurance that a pro-
gram-related investment does in fact qualify as such, without hav-
ing to jump through the traditional hoops foundations have had
48. See Bishop, supra note 5, at 244.  See Feit, supra note 43, at 12, for a
discussion of the IRS’s increasingly liberal interpretation of what qualifies as a
PRI so as to “lubricate” the process.  Despite this liberal application, the
expense for a private letter ruling begins with a $10,000 filing fee.  Rev. Proc.
2012-8, 2012-1 I.R.B. 241. Naturally, legal fees and other costs can add signifi-
cant additional expenses.
49. Bishop, supra note 5, at 244; see also Joseph & Kosaras, supra note 2, at
26.
50. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii).
51. Joseph & Kosaras, supra note 2, at 25.
52. Tyler, supra note 29, at 124.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Lang & Minnigh, supra note 4, at 19.
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to address56 and second, to provide notice to foundations (and
the IRS) that investors and organizations are looking for an
increased emphasis on program-related investments as an alter-
native means for raising capital.57
For an L3C, PRI investments serve not only as an infusion of
capital itself, but also as a tool used to leverage investments by
private actors.  By focusing on the PRI rules, the L3C seeks to
create investment incentives.58  With an initial PRI investment
the L3C can create a tranched financing structure.59  As the “sub-
stantial purpose” test indicates, an investment would not qualify
as a PRI if it is made on the same terms as another profit-seeking
investor would have made.  Tranche investing helps to ensure
that this qualification is met.60  Under this investment scheme,
the private foundation would make a PRI in an L3C, accepting a
high-risk and below-market return for that investment.61  Addi-
tional investments thereby become more attractive by “improving
the credit rating and thereby lowering the cost of capital.”62  Dis-
tributing risk in this fashion makes the investment that much
more attractive to a commercial enterprise.63  A tranched invest-
ment scheme also allows for a clear class system in the operating
agreement.64  Having a private foundation with its own class and
governing powers (e.g., voting rights, veto powers) would help
ensure that the socially beneficial mission is not subsumed in the
profit seeking venture.  This provides an important mechanism
for the L3C to raise capital and still maintain its identity.
The L3C is also a brand.  The hope is that organizations will
be better able to raise funds by attracting socially-conscious inves-
tors with the L3C brand.  One of the key mechanisms not-for-
profits use to raise money is the public’s trust in the not-for-profit
56. See Joseph & Kosaras, supra note 2, at 29.
57. See Feit, supra note 43, at 3.
58. Lang & Minnigh, supra note 4, at 17.
59. Id.
60. Bishop, supra note 5, at 263.
61. Id.
62. Kleinberger, supra note 5, at 884–85.
63. Tyler, supra note 29, at 125.  It is important to note, however, that the
universe in which L3Cs operate is not limited to private foundation investment.
While the governing statute is based on the PRI language, the L3C does not
require investments from a private foundation.  As a separate legal entity, fund-
ing for the L3C can take many forms.  As Tyler discusses, “among the LLC-
derived benefits of the L3C form is the flexibility in financing and governance
structures that are permitted . . . . [tranching approaches] are not likely to
characterize all (or even most) L3Cs.” Id. at 125 n.36.  While the tranching
model looks to take advantage of program-related investments, the potential of
the form should not be viewed as limited to only that model. Id. at 125.
64. Lang & Minnigh, supra note 4, at 18.
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designation.65  It is generally understood that a not-for-profit
works in those areas where for-profit entities cannot, or will not,
go in the course of regular business.  The public generally trusts
the not-for-profit to use donated funds for a charitable purpose.
In creating the L3C, Robert Lang envisioned a similar sense of
security and purpose.66  Having a positive brand associated with
the L3C label should help to generate business investment and
consumer trust.
Ultimately, the goal of the L3C is to engage in a level of
social enterprise not achievable through traditional for-profit
and not-for profit means.  By aligning with foundations through
the use of PRIs and providing incentives for investors interested
in social enterprise, the L3C represents an opportunity for busi-
ness ventures to direct themselves toward the public benefit.
Though detractors argue against the efficacy of the form, this
statutory innovation is a unique tool meant to address the gap
created by traditional business models.  Circular as it may be, the
existence of the L3C speaks to the legitimacy of its purpose.  As a
brand and as a vehicle, the L3C embodies an important way of
looking at the goals of business.
C. The Limitations of the L3C Form: Arguments Against the Efficacy
of the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company
While authors, investors, and eight states have seen a benefit
in the L3C, there remain questions about the necessity and effi-
cacy of the form.  Critiques of the L3C revolve around three
main arguments: a lack of federal recognition means the L3C
provides no additional benefits to the existing business entity
structure, fiduciary duties created by the dual purpose of social
benefit and profit are unworkable, and the goals of the form can
already be executed through the LLC without the addition of an
L3C statute.
The L3C statute was initially developed to mimic PRI
requirements so as to facilitate private foundation investment.
However, while the language may be enacted into law in individ-
ual states, Congress and the IRS have not made a formal judg-
ment on the L3C.67  Proponents have been unable to secure a
rebuttable presumption of PRI status on L3C investments at the
65. See Nathalie Kylander & Christopher Stone, The Role of Brand in the
Nonprofit Sector, 10 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 35 (2012).
66. Lang & Minnigh, supra note 4, at 17 (“A brand is important as a quick
identifier that lets everyone know what the entity is.  A nonprofit is a brand and
L3Cs needed that identification.”).
67. Kleinberger, supra note 5, at 905–07.
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federal level.68 The fact that the IRS has not disclosed an
approach to the form means private foundations are likely in the
same place they began—juggling the complicated and expensive
rules surrounding PRIs.  The response to these criticisms is that
while the lack of a federal exception made for the L3C certainly
dampens the enthusiasm behind it, the current state of affairs
may not remain the status quo.  Should states continue to seek
mechanisms to drive social enterprise, a formal federal approach
may emerge.  Further, the funding and the social enterprise
goals of an L3C are not limited to foundation investments. The
L3C is merely meant to facilitate them.
Investments that are made for profit drive the second cri-
tique.  The concern is that the fiduciary duties of L3C directors
will be muddled as a result of their serving “two masters.”  Diffi-
culties arise in ensuring that the L3C remains committed to
social enterprise objectives, when dealing with SEC disclosure
laws, and with expectations for directors.69  In response, John
Tyler discusses a formulation of L3C fiduciary duties that is
meant to address the perceived irreconcilability of the L3C’s “two
masters”:
- [T]he primary purpose of the L3C operations must
prioritize pursuing charitable, exempt purposes, thereby
exalting charitable purpose above all other purposes; and
- [R]ealizing profit and enhancing value can be pur-
poses of the enterprise as long as they are not significant
purposes, thereby subordinating profit motive and placing
it not just secondary on the continuum of permissible pur-
poses, but near the extreme end of such continuum.70
It is important to understand that there is an ordering of fidu-
ciary duties.  At its most basic, the form requires the pursuit of an
exempt purpose while acknowledging that it is perfectly possible
to derive a profit in the process.
In addition to considerations of whether the L3C will actu-
ally help in the development of social enterprise is the question
of whether the new form is even necessary.  Professor Daniel
Kleinberger argues that the placement of the L3C statute as an
68. Id. at 907–08; see also J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C
Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Opti-
mal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273
(2010).
69. Callison & Vestal, supra note 68, at 287–88.  While a brief discussion
of these issues follows, a more fleshed out discussion of these critiques is unnec-
essary for this Note.
70. Tyler, supra note 29, at 141.
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addendum to state LLC law is telling.71  His contention is that
most LLC statutes are capable of accomplishing the same goals
the L3C is designed to accomplish.72  He argues that an LLC
should be able to receive PRIs and, through an operating agree-
ment, meet social enterprise goals.  The response to this point is
that while there is an inherent flexibility to the LLC form, this
flexibility does not necessarily negate the benefit of an L3C stat-
ute.  Foremost, there is no guarantee that a state will allow an
LLC to pursue a purpose other than one for-profit.73  Addition-
ally, as discussed, the L3C moniker as a brand is meant to pro-
vide value through driving investor interest and consumer
confidence.  This is lost through a reliance on existing LLC
statutes.74
Finally, notwithstanding these issues, the continued adop-
tion of the L3C and increased focus on social enterprise as a valid
guiding principle is evidence of an interest in having such a gap-
filling entity.  It is possible that with the development of applica-
tions for the L3C—specific instances where the form facilitated
the growth of a profitable and socially beneficial industry—
awareness and acceptance of the form will develop in turn.  The
rest of this Note will examine how the L3C can play this role in
the context of the wind energy sector.
II. FACILITATING INVESTMENT IN THE WIND ENERGY SECTOR
THROUGH THE L3C
A. The State of Wind Energy Investment
The use of fossil fuels plays a significant role in human
health and quality of life. There is a stark difference between air
quality in Los Angeles or Beijing, and the air in Buford, Wyo-
71. Kleinberger, supra note 5, at 896–98.
72. Id.
73. Professor Kleinberger notes that many LLC statutes no longer require
a for-profit purpose, but discusses only the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act (RULLCA).  This Act has been characterized with the statement:
“its prognosis for becoming widely adopted looks bleak.”  Doug Batey, Nebraska
and Wyoming Enact the Revised Uniform LLC Act, LLC LAW MONITOR (Nov. 22,
2010), http://www.llclawmonitor.com/2010/11/articles/revised-uniform-llc-
act/nebraska-and-wyoming-enact-the-revised-uniform-llc-act/.  However, with
New Jersey’s and California’s recent adoption of RULLCA, the acts “prognosis”
may have changed.  Doug Batey, California and New Jersey Adopt RULLCA, the
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, LLC LAW MONITOR (Jan. 2, 2013),
http://www.llclawmonitor.com/tags/rullca/.
74. Professor Kleinberger also critiques the notion of an L3C brand. See
Kleinberger, supra note 5, at 897–99.  A full examination of his argument is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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ming.75  The cost of oil has increased dramatically, with electric-
ity bills following in step.76  Whether sustainability and
combating climate change is a goal or not, increasing energy out-
put through alternative sources in order to reduce costs, improve
the environment, and develop industry is a reasonable one.  The
development of the wind energy industry is a means to this end.
Though wind power suffers from an intermittent nature, the
energy is inherently clean.  There are over 470 manufacturing
facilities in the U.S. that develop products for the production of
wind energy.77  The wind power industry has increased its pro-
duction in the U.S. by 35% over the last four years.78  Wind
energy continues to attract heavy interest from investors like
Berkshire Hathaway79 and utility companies.80  This private
investment has been buttressed by the federal government,
which has emphasized alternative energy investment generally
through tax policy.81  State governments have also provided
incentives and requirements to ensure the development of the
alternative energy sector.82  The L3C can provide the additional
link in the chain that allows for local to utility-sized development
of wind energy production, bringing public and environmental
benefits to communities and actualizing state and federal policy.
The L3C may provide the tool for actors interested in the
development of the wind energy sector to overcome the commu-
nity and financial concerns that have limited the growth of the
industry to date.83  The nature of the L3C form and its alignment
75. As of July 20, 2011, Buford, Wyoming had only a single resident.
Everett Rosenfeld, Meet the Only Resident of America’s Smallest Town, TIME NEW-
SFEED (July 20, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/07/20/meet-the-only-
resident-of-americas-smallest-town/.
76. Diane Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, As Price of Oil Soars, Users Can Only
Shiver and Cross Their Fingers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at A23.
77. Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/
learnabout/industrystats/index. cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
78. Id.
79. See Noah Buhayar, Buffett Energy Firm to Buy Illinois Project in Wind Bet,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2012-01-23/buffett-energy-firm-to-buy-illinois-project-in-wind-bet.
html.
80. See EXXONMOBIL, 2012 THE OUTLOOK FOR ENERGY: A VIEW TO 2040, at
8 (2012), available at http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/files/news_pub_
eo.pdf.
81. Discussed infra at Part II.D.
82. See infra Part II.C.
83. Including the Not-In-My-Back-Yard dilemma, discussed infra Part
II.B., communities disinclined to accept renewable energies (e.g., because the
community revolves around coal mining) as well as issues plaguing the renewa-
ble energy industry generally, including reliability questions, grid limitations,
and industry ossification, to name a few.
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with social enterprise (as opposed to the pure profit goals of
traditional energy investors) will facilitate development.  As a
social enterprise vehicle, the L3C brand will represent a different
type of entity to local communities that may help to overcome
the Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) conundrum associated with
wind energy projects.  As a creature of state law, the L3C will be
able to fill the gap made by state regulatory initiatives. Finally,
the L3C’s structure and flexibility will help in distributing federal
tax benefits associated with wind energy projects.  The L3C is
thus well suited to be an effective tool for supply-side actors and
social entrepreneurs. It can partially internalize the cumbersome
externalities associated with wind energy and provide the means
for private foundations to invest in socially desirable work while
meeting minimum annual investment requirements.
B. The L3C, Social Enterprise, and Community Acceptance
of Wind Energy
The relationship between humans and the environment is
treated differently throughout the world.  The U.S. has recog-
nized the importance of the environment through a variety of
different mechanisms, including the Environmental Protection
Agency and the National Parks System.84  Telling in the Ameri-
can model is that the National Environmental Policy Act requires
that energy developers on federal public lands provide an “Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement” (EIS).  An EIS analyzes how pro-
posed projects will affect “the quality of the human environment.”85
At face value this relationship appears to be one of management.
The protections in place are born of the legislative and regula-
tory process rather than grounded in an understanding of some-
thing fundamental to the human experience.  Juxtapose this
approach to many international frameworks and the ethical
imperative of careful natural resource stewardship through the
development of alternative energy becomes more apparent.  For
example, over 100 countries have constitutional provisions pro-
tecting the environment.86  The European Convention on
Human Rights recognizes environmental pollution as an affront
84. The Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service oversee
more than 44% of the land that comprises the eleven westernmost states in the
continental U.S.  Eric S. Spengler, Note, A Shift in the Wind: The Siting of Wind
Power Projects on Public Lands in the Obama Era, 86 IND. L.J. 1185, 1191 (2011).
85. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2010)).
86. Helle Tegner Anker et al., Wind Energy and the Law: A Comparative
Analysis, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 145, 158 n.46 (2009).
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to human rights.87  The specific obligations and imperatives laid
out in international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol
(which the U.S. has not ratified) also point to an essential con-
nection between humans and the environment.  By framing the
goal of increased alternative energy production as an ethical or
rights-based effort the production of wind energy is aligned with
the social enterprise mission of the L3C.
Conceptualizing the development of wind energy as a social
imperative promoted by the L3C allows for the “L3C brand” to
develop.  With this, the L3C form may be able to help overcome
the significant stumbling blocks associated with the Not-In-My-
Back-Yard (NIMBY) dilemma.  NIMBY describes the behavior of
individuals who fight against the development of certain indus-
tries or facilities within proximity to their homes.88 By no means
does the L3C completely remove the difficulties of having wind
turbines near residential areas, but the “good” that comes with
the development of alternative energy may be more easily con-
ceptualized by a community when the work is being done by an
organization with a socially-driven mission and a local connec-
tion.  Taking from the not-for-profit experience, the L3C may be
able to leverage the trust generally given a not-for-profit to more
easily facilitate the development of wind energy production.
With careful articulation, an L3C’s social enterprise goals and
the production of wind energy can be aligned without betraying
the underlying ethical obligations characterizing the organiza-
tion and the work.  In doing so, those people affected by the pro-
duction of the wind energy may be more willing, or at least less
opposed, to the introduction of the infrastructure in their
communities.
C. Wind Energy Is Local Energy
State governments have actively engaged the alternative
energy sector.  States with the comparative advantage that allows
for the development of the wind energy industry have aggres-
sively implemented programs that facilitate growth.89  These
87. The infringement results insofar as environmental concerns harm pri-
vate property rights. Id. at 157–58.
88. See generally Tiffany Hsu, Wind Farms Multiply, Fueling Clashes with
Nearby Residents, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/
jul/24/business/la-fi-wind-power-20110724.  Some of the concerns residents
express revolve around aesthetic complaints and the impact of turbines on
avian life. Id.
89. “Utility-scale” wind projects have been installed in thirty-eight states.
State Policy, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/issues/state_policy/
index.cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).  Forty-six states have wind energy-specific
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include general goals for attaining a certain percentage of
energy provided by alternative sources.  These goals are attained
through the use of floors, known as Renewable Portfolio Stan-
dards (RPS) (or similarly, Renewable Portfolio Goals, or RPGs).
States have also implemented their own tax credits and grants.
Finally, states have worked to provide support on the demand
side.  As a creature of state law, the L3C is well positioned to take
advantage of the incentives that individual states provide and to
work at a local level.
The development of wind energy has a significant impact on
a community.  Operational wind farms have a definite footprint;
infrastructure needs to be put in place often at great scale.90
However, people generally favor wind power in the abstract.91
To support alternative energy, states have adopted RPGs and
RPSs.  Eight states have RPGs and twenty-nine states have RPSs.92
These goals and standards are meant to create competition
within the energy industry by setting a base goal or requirement
for alternative energy production by a specific date.93  States are
creating a market.  These standards are flexible and are respon-
sive to public participation.94  The L3C is well suited to fill the
gap that these standards create.  As a state-based entity, the L3C
can leverage private foundation money invested in engaging
local community building.  This should then attract other inves-
tors to help develop the project while keeping the local “feel.”
While for-profit corporations are also creatures of state law, the
social entrepreneurship aspects of the L3C tap into the sense of
“trust” charities are afforded.  This may facilitate the L3C’s ability
to have a local, on the ground, connection with a community
while fulfilling state RPS/RPG policies.  Utilities forced to take
part in renewable projects because of these standards have their
burdens lessened while the L3C fulfills its mission of social entre-
incentives.  Corey Stephen Shoock, Note, Blowing in the Wind: How a Two-Tiered
National Renewable Portfolio Standard, a System Benefits Fund, and Other Programs
Will Reshape American Energy Investment and Reduce Fossil Fuel Externalities, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1011, 1023 (2007).
90. Commercial turbines can grow to 116 meters in rotor sweep diame-
ter. Large Commercial Wind Turbines, WIND ENERGY: THE FACTS, http://www.
wind-energy-the-facts.org/en/part-i-technology/chapter-3-wind-turbine-tech-
nology/evolution-of-commercial-wind-turbine-technology/large-commercial-
wind-turbines.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
91. Anker et al., supra note 86, at 159.
92. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps
/RPS_map.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
93. Shoock, supra note 89, at 1049–53.
94. Id.
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preneurship.  That is, the gap in the market between the state
standards and current capacity can be met more quickly with the
assistance of L3Cs dedicated to wind energy production.
Beyond creating the market, states have also worked to grow
the market.  By providing a variety of tax credits, grants, and
property tax exemptions, significant incentives have been put in
place to facilitate meeting alternative energy production goals.95
Combined with production goals set by state legislatures, these
policies describe a long-term commitment to the development of
the wind industry.  The L3C is then able to make use of the subsi-
dies and incentives in much the same way that they are posi-
tioned to do at the national level.96  Of course there must be a
sense of stability associated with these incentives in order to raise
the significant investment required to get sizable wind projects
off the ground.  These RPSs imply the necessary long-term state
support.
A locally positioned L3C is also well suited to develop exper-
tise within an individual state’s regulatory regime.  The compli-
cated federal regulatory framework that governs the energy
industry in conjunction with compliance with work in multiple
states and offshore wind farms requires a high degree of sophisti-
cation.  If an L3C is positioned as a local entity working in a com-
munity or individual state, the required expertise is narrowed to
the locale.  By reducing red tape and increasing familiarity with a
place an L3C can fulfill the charitable goals of private founda-
tions, make use of the dual level of state and federal incentives,
and effectively engage and communicate within communities.
Individual state action has created what is (hopefully) a stable
market by creating incentives for local action in a manner that
emphasizes the L3C’s strengths and provides additional impetus
for the L3C’s use in facilitating the growth of wind energy.
Stabilization of the demand-side market also implicates the
role of the L3C.  Just as energy producers have sought consistent
policy and government endorsement, end-users also seek consis-
tent beneficial treatment in their use (or creation) of alternative
energy.97  An important part of this has been the institution of
95. See id. at 1047 (discussing New York State’s policy of exempting wind
energy power systems from property tax for fifteen years); Summary Maps,
DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.
dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=1&RE=1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
96. See infra Part III.D.
97. The role of inconsistent government support or subsidy on the alter-
native energy market has been described as “‘the blade of a saw, rising and
falling each time subsidies came and went.’”  Neil Peretz, Growing the Energy
Efficiency Market Through Third-Party Financing, 30 ENERGY L.J. 377, 384 (2009)
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net-metering policies.98  Net-metering requires utility companies
to purchase back the energy produced from non-utility owned
sources.99  This allows consumers to contribute the energy they
produce on their own (through their own wind energy produc-
ing turbines).  The utility will only charge the consumer for the
net amount of consumption.100  As a community-based organiza-
tion, this is a perfect place for L3C work.  By engaging energy
users directly the L3C can communicate, educate, and develop
small scale projects that have the dual benefit of providing a
decrease in energy expenses for the consumer and reaching the
social and environmental goals of the organization.  This work
both increases the net amount of wind energy in the system while
providing a benefit to consumers.  This small-scale work is a way
for the L3C to directly connect with the public about the
increased role wind energy can play in powering their lives, while
providing the consumer with a means of immediately reducing
their energy costs.
State engagement in the alternative energy field, and more
specifically wind energy, has provided the market space for the
L3C to take advantage of state requirements and incentives in a
way that larger scale utilities cannot.  The L3C is also well suited
to provide education and opportunity for individuals and com-
munities looking to take advantage of demand-side incentives.  If
the L3C can take advantage of the myriad opportunities an indi-
vidual state provides, wind energy’s share of the market will grow
and we will be closer to meeting environmental, social, and eco-
nomic goals.
(quoting Joshua Green, The Elusive Green Economy, ATLANTIC, July/August 2009,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/07/the-elusive-green-
economy/307554/).  Peretz also discusses how an over-reliance on these
national subsidies has led to far more severe fluctuations in investment than in
some European and Asian countries. Id.  The hard floors that many states have
put in place in conjunction with the L3C’s social entrepreneurship and flexibil-
ity may help to overcome this issue.  Be it a product of scale or its socially driven
nature, the L3C can take advantage of the state stability without having to rely
as heavily on federal incentives (with fewer groups of investors seeking the cred-
its and incentives generated by the L3C) and provide stability in the market
itself by filling it.  Additionally, as private foundations do not have to rely
directly on the federal incentives as a result of their tax-exempt status, they may
be better suited to riding the waves of changing federal policy.
98. Forty-three states, Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico have instituted
net-metering policies.  See Net Metering, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summary
maps/net_metering_map.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
99. Shoock, supra note 89, at 1047–48.
100. Id.
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D. Federal Policy: Development Through Tax Treatment
and Incentives
Federal engagement with wind energy production has been
significant.  In 2008 the Department of Energy and the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory released a report that outlined
how 20% of U.S. energy could be acquired through wind energy
by 2030.101  The Obama Administration, through the Depart-
ment of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, has specifically
endorsed this goal.102  The Obama Administration has also
focused on the use of public lands in the West as a means for
growing wind energy infrastructure.103  And while executive
branch rhetoric has been important in bringing wind energy into
the public discourse, it is congressional action that has had a
larger impact on the growth of the wind energy sector.104
Congress has used two separate tax incentives, the Produc-
tion Tax Credit (PTC) and the Modified Accelerated Cost Recov-
ery System (MACRS), to facilitate the growth of the wind energy
sector.  The PTC and MACRS provide tax benefits to actors
investing in the nation’s alternative energy infrastructure.  The
ability of the L3C to take advantage of these incentives may help
facilitate the growth of the wind energy industry.  This section
will discuss the nature of the tax incentives associated with the
production of wind energy.  We will then consider several financ-
ing mechanisms in order to demonstrate how the L3C will be an
effective tool towards reaching the 20% by 2030 goal.
E. Tax Incentives for Investing in Wind Energy
Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and subsequent
amendments, producers of wind energy receive a Production
Tax Credit (PTC).105  The PTC provides an inflation adjusted tax
credit per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced, over a ten-year
period.106  The PTC has been a “key driver of wind power devel-
opment” for a variety of reasons: it provides a discreet incentive
for companies looking to develop a project, acts as a different
financial benefit not tied to power prices, and indicates a federal
101. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY,
20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S.
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 7 (2008), available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systems
integration/pdfs/2008/20_percent_wind.pdf.
102. Spengler, supra note 84, at 1207.
103. Id. at 1208.
104. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
105. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2010).
106. Id. at § 45(a).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\27-1\NDE110.txt unknown Seq: 21 19-APR-13 13:29
2013] A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP 267
commitment to the development of the industry.107  The inter-
play between these tax incentives and tax-exempt private founda-
tions is key to the L3C stimulating wind energy investment.
The use of the PTC as a tax incentive is most limited in that
the credit has expired and been renewed several times over the
last twenty years.108  The current iteration of the PTC is set to
expire on December 31, 2013; however, given the Obama
Administration’s continued focus on alternative energy and the
history of renewal of the credit over the last two decades, there is
a good chance the credit will be extended.109  This credit has
played an important role in the development of investments in
these wind energy systems.  Given the volume of tax benefits that
the PTC provides, historically, small, single-purpose entities that
are developing projects have looked for investors or buyers who
could swallow the tax benefits.110  This principle should still
apply for investors interested in tax benefits with the L3C.  If tax
credits attributable to wind energy production made by the L3C
can be transferred to investors through the operating agreement
(given that private foundations do not need these credits), these
PTCs are a significant incentive for investment through the L3C
form.111
While the PTC provides an incentive for the production of
wind energy, the MACRS allows for recovery of portions of invest-
ments made in wind projects.  This is done through accelerated
income tax deductions.112  Under MACRS, wind projects may
qualify for a five-year, 200% depreciation.113  Included under this
107. JOHN P. HARPER ET AL., WIND PROJECT FINANCING STRUCTURES: A
REVIEW & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 2 (2007).
108. Id.
109. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(d)(1).
110. HARPER ET AL., supra note 107, at 2.
111. See 9 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX’N § 35A:26 (2012) (“The
provisions of the operating agreement determine the distributive shares of
income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit.”).  Not all states will have an LLC
statute, but most (or all) will have one governing LLPs; the flexibility of the
operating agreements for both forms are similar. See 26 U.S.C. § 702(a)(7)
(2010); 26 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2010) (“A partner’s distributive share of . . . credit
shall, except as otherwise provided in the chapter, be determined by the part-
nership agreement.”); Stephen L. Nelson, What’s the Difference Between an LLC
and LLP?, LLCS EXPLAINED, http://www.llcsexplained.com/Whats-the-Differ-
ence-between-an-LLC-and-LLP.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).  Though
assigning tax credits is not unique to the L3C, the fact that private foundations
likely have no use for the credits means negotiation costs associated with distrib-
uting the credits can be avoided.
112. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 168 (West 2010).
113. HARPER ET AL., supra note 107, at 3.  Harper describes the deprecia-
tion as a “double declining-balance depreciation.” Id.  This depreciation allow-
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provision is equipment which uses wind energy to generate elec-
tricity, heat, or cooling in structures, turbines, generators, trans-
fer equipment, and more.114  On average, the depreciation is
valued at approximately 26% of the total installed system cost.115
This depreciation value can act as an incentive for investment or
be passed on to consumers through lesser costs (without a signifi-
cant impact on returns).116  Use of the tax deductions in this
fashion would address the dual purposes of the L3C.  By develop-
ing an alternative energy source and passing it on to the con-
sumer at a lower price the L3C will be serving environmental
interests and increasing community wealth.  The price of the
energy developed in this fashion can be stabilized while ensuring
competitive returns to equity investors when coupled with the
L3C’s flexible risk/return allocations.  MACRS is an especially
productive tool for use by the L3C.
These tax benefits provide the first layer of incentives for
why the L3C would be an effective vehicle for facilitating growth
in the wind energy sector.  If the L3C is to work in capturing
private foundation PRI, the tax credits and deductions associated
with the PTCs and the MACRS provide a significant incentive for
social entrepreneurs to invest.  The flexibility of the L3C operat-
ing agreement in allocating risk and return, the private founda-
tion’s limited need for tax benefits, and the ability of a
foundation to shoulder some of the costs of the initial investment
mean that this may be far more attractive for an investor or a
corporation than going it alone.117
F. Financial Models for Wind Energy Investment.
Financing structures for developing wind energy projects
have grown commensurate in scope with the size of the industry.
ance has the possibility of amounting to between 90–95% of the total costs for a
wind project qualifying for the depreciation.  This degree of recovery may also
have a buoying effect for an L3C.  Given that the L3C would be able to recover
so much value for the property as a tax deduction, there are opportunities to
pass the incentive on to investors in the L3C, or, if possible, in a self-sustaining
model allowing for further investment in additional wind energy projects.
114. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(a)(3) (West 2009).
115. Steven Ferrey, The New Climate Metric: The Sustainable Corporation and
Energy, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 395 (2011).
116. Id.
117. The potential branding associated with the L3C would also have a
role here.  Given the recent focus on income disparity and corporate growth,
institutional and significant private investors taking advantage of additional tax
benefits might not sit well.  However, the benefit of the L3C brand would allow
an investor to show the public that its intentions lie beyond the mere produc-
tion of wealth and acquisition of tax benefits.
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While the complexity surrounding the financing of these
projects has grown, and as bigger players have joined the fray,
the flexibility and the socially driven mission of the L3C remains
significant for a project of any scale.  An analysis of some of the
more typical financing schemes shows how the L3C would facili-
tate the growth of the wind energy industry.  The level of sophis-
tication that follows the investment of significant funds
necessarily limits the breadth of this analysis, but this initial
inquiry is at least demonstrative of the capability of the L3C to
provide an effective vehicle for spurring investment.
Much of the early history of wind energy development in the
U.S. was marked by investor reticence.  Before 1999 the market
considered wind energy to be too risky.118  This led to smaller
projects suffering from a difficult debt acquisition process.119
The emergence of strategic investors as a driving force began
around the first expiration of the PTC in 1999.120  The financing
model used by these strategic investors—which were largely util-
ity-sized projects—involved internal funding.  There were few
debt financing opportunities.121 In the early 2000s the expiration
of the PTC contributed to a slowing pace of wind project devel-
opment.  Then in 2002 institutional investors began to engage
the wind energy sector.  These institutional investors sought a
passive role in the management of the wind projects and could
not necessarily make totally efficient use of tax benefits.  How-
ever, they could finance the projects in a tax-efficient manner.122
This period also saw the growth of debt financing of a portfolio
of wind projects.123  The growth in complexity of the financing
models has coincided with a tremendous growth in project
scale.124
118. HARPER ET AL., supra note 107, at 5 (“[T]he financing community
generally perceived the wind market as exotic, i.e., complex, small, and risky.”).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 6–7.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 7–9.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Consider that the U.S. had a cumulative capacity of 11,575 MW at
the end of 2006. Id. at 1.  Five years later the U.S. has a cumulative wind capac-
ity of 49,802 MW. See Industry Statistics, supra note 77.  However, this growth
must be balanced against the fact that U.S. wind power capacity is only 20% of
the world’s installed energy power; electricity production contributes about
25% of U.S. emissions of certain air pollutants.  Ferrey, supra note 115, at
388–89.  Given the scale of the U.S.’s open land and coasts, the country’s inter-
est in extricating itself from reliance on foreign energy, and the (relative) finan-
cial stability of the country, the smaller percentage of production capacity is
difficult to reconcile.
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The development of these financing structures has resulted
in a multitude of opportunities for the L3C to help facilitate the
growth of the wind energy sector.  The current state of wind
energy financing might allow for the L3C to act as a project inves-
tor or as an institutional investor in its own right (depending on
the ability of the company to raise capital).  At the most basic
level the L3C could be free to follow what has been dubbed the
“corporate” structure of financing.125  In the corporate structure
one entity acts as the single developer and investor, typically
through the formation of a subsidiary.  This type of structure pro-
vides the most flexibility.  As a result of sole ownership, all cash
flows and tax benefits return to the parent company.126  This
presents a powerful argument in favor of the L3C as a model for
a wind energy developer.  For a private foundation a smaller-
scale project within a community would address environmental
concerns and economic growth.127  For social entrepreneurs
there is an opportunity to address those same public benefit con-
cerns while retaining profits and tax benefits with the private
foundations swallowing much of the risk.128
Another financing model that engages the L3C’s strengths is
the “Strategic Investor Flip.”  Under this structure a strategic
investor and developer would jointly own the project, sharing tax
benefits and cash flows pro rata.  However, the investor would
make most of the initial capital contribution and would receive
their corresponding returns based on their investment.129  Then,
once a negotiated point is hit (typically after ten years, corre-
sponding with the end of the PTC benefits), the percentages
125. HARPER ET AL., supra note 107, at 14.
126. Id. at 15.
127. This model does raise private benefit concerns. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2010).  However, in Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053,
1070 (1989), the tax court revoked the tax-exempt status of a school that taught
campaign strategy because the school “conducted its educational activities with
the partisan objective of benefiting Republican candidates and entities.”  That
is, because nearly all of the school’s graduates went on to work on campaigns
for the Republican Party, the school was operated to support the Republican
Party, and was conferring a private benefit.  In the context of the L3C and wind
energy investment, the benefit to the social entrepreneur would remain inci-
dental to the overall operation.  The private foundation would be serving a
diverse set of public interests by investing in the wind energy systems rather
than acting as a feedback loop for the social entrepreneurs investing in the
projects.
128. This sole proprietorship type project necessarily requires a signifi-
cant capital outlay.  Focusing on the smaller scale project while using this struc-
ture would likely be more feasible, as well as more fitting considering the
purpose of the L3C.
129. HARPER ET AL., supra note 107, at 18.
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“flip” towards a more favorable allocation to the developer.130
The project developer will often also have the right to purchase
ownership interests from the investor as well.  An L3C acting
either as an investor or developer makes sense under this model.
The L3C could be beneficial if this structure were employed as
both an investor and as a project developer.  If the L3C is well
capitalized it could provide the initial investment to get smaller
projects off the ground.  Because the L3C would still be able to
capture profits and the PTC benefits, private investors in the L3C
would be satisfied.  Further, given that the developer may have
the ability to buy out the investor at the end of a defined period,
the L3C may be free to extricate itself to reinvest in new projects.
Finally, if an L3C utilized a portfolio approach to access debt it
would simultaneously overcome one of the limitations of the not-
for-profit world (accessing debt) and engage a much broader
range of social issues.  If the L3C were the developing entity, the
L3C brand would also be an important asset.  The strategic inves-
tor would be able to align with a socially beneficial company.
The ability of the L3C to ultimately gain control of the project as
a whole would also help the L3C remain a community-based
institution that provides clean energy and jobs, rather than have
the project become part of a conglomerate.
The L3C has significant potential as a vehicle for facilitating
growth in the alternative energy sector.  If the L3C is able to gen-
erate private foundation investment, the company will be able to
offset the large amount of initial private capital investment and
effectively distribute risk.  Foundation investment in the L3C
could lower cost of capital associated with entry into the wind
energy market because of the risk distribution.  As a result, the
L3C would be able to charge more competitively for their
power—allowing wind energy to better compete with fossil fuels.
While the discussion of financing structure mechanisms was nec-
essarily brief, the belief is that the descriptions that were pro-
vided demonstrate the applicability of the L3C to this sector.
The goal of socially beneficial work that might drive an investor
towards an L3C would be additionally buoyed by the tax benefits
available from wind energy investment.  While not carrying the
same social cache as a not-for-profit, the L3C may help lessen
tensions in a community reticent to accept the addition of wind
power generation.  While many questions remain as to how the
L3C will develop as a legal entity, demonstrating the benefits of
the form for different industries and projects should help to pro-
mote its adoption and acceptance.
130. Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the ability of the Low-Profit Limited Liability
Company to act as an effective vehicle for the development of the
wind energy industry is contingent upon its acceptance in the
many states and by the federal government.  With this accept-
ance, the L3C can have a significant role in meeting state and
federal goals for wind energy production while providing envi-
ronmental and economic benefits to local communities.
The L3C channels social entrepreneurship and financial
goals.  The model picks up the same ethical goals as the not-for-
profit sector and adds the potential for providing economic ben-
efits that the not-for-profit world cannot.  With proper oversight
the L3C can retain its “soul” while bringing new investors into
the fold.131
The L3C is also positioned to take advantage of state and
federal requirements and incentives.  A flexible operational
agreement and private foundation involvement allows private
investors to take better advantage of state and federal incentives.
The form also allows the L3C to retain the feel of a community-
based association—which will help to overcome some of the
‘Not-In-My-Backyard’ problems.  The L3C can also take some of
the burden off of utilities who do not want to move to alternative
energy systems.
Both federal and state governments have emphasized that
developing wind energy is essential to U.S. energy independence
and the growth of the alternative energy industry.  The L3C form
can provide an effective vehicle for the development of the wind
energy industry by filling gaps the government and existing
industry cannot or will not.  Faced with the increasingly dissatisfy-
ing notion of the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels, an innovative
approach that makes use of the nation’s sustainable resources is
essential.  The L3C form is able to capture investors interested in
socially desirable projects, protect the environment, and bring
jobs into communities – all this while making use of private foun-
dation funds and further energizing the wind industry.  The
applicability of the L3C to this type of work will hopefully further
inspire states to consider the benefits of the form while facilitat-
ing the growth of the wind energy sector in the U.S.
131. Oversight should come from the private foundations, social entre-
preneurs, and management structure of the L3Cs, who are vested and invested
in developing a viable bridge between the for-profit and not-for-profit worlds.
The IRS will also act as a backstop as it does with other not-for-profit type
entities.
